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This study examines the political eflectiveness of the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) as a policy making tool, by applying the Modular Command and Control
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
From the moment President Ronald Reagan announced the "Star Wars" concept
in 1983. numerous evaluation issues concerning the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
have been discussed, including measures of force effectiveness, policy or political
effectiveness, effectiveness, and performance. In this regard, a workshop was held from
9-11 September 1986 to discuss the evaluation problems. Participants included both
SDI and .VIodular Command/Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) experts, who were
charged with "using the MCES to develop measures for evaluation within four critical
SDI arenas:
1) Overall SDI Architecture
2) Key Architectural Trade - offs
3) BM;C3 Systems
4) SDI Software
[Ref. 1: p, ij.
The workshop established, from its very beginnings, that the current goal and
primary measure of policy effectiveness of the SDI research program is deterrence
[Ref 1: p. i]. A logical extension, then, is that the primary goal is to deter the Soviet
Union and the spread o[ communism. In this sense, it is imperative that the idea of
deterrence be approached, not from the point of view of the United States, but from
the point of view of the Soviet Union. The decision and policy makers in the Soviet
Union, because o[ their historical perspective, cultural environment, contextual and
political system differences, and their basic ideological differences, view deterrence not
as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD,) or even as defense against MAD. as the
United States does. Rather, the Soviet poUtical machine views deterrence as their
ability to possess adequate miUtary strength to maintain an offensive capability, in
order to retain their ideology and continue to instil world communism. [Ref. 2]
It is with this mindset that the efforts begun by the Overall SDI Architecture
working group, under the leadership of Dr. Thomas P. Rona, Office oi' Science and
Technology Policy, and composed of this author, Dr. Ricki Sweet, of Sweet Associates,
CAPT K.M. Duff. USN. of Naval Space and Warfare Comand (NAVSPAWAR). MAJ
Bernard Galing, USA, of TRADOC Research and Education Management (TREM),
CAPT Ingabee Stone, UASF. of HQ SACSICCP. OfTutt AFB, and Dr. Michael
Melich, of the Naval Postgraduate School, will be continued in this thesis. The MCES
will be appUed to the overall political aspects of SDI, working towards the
development of political effectiveness measures. Since none of the working group
members are Sovietologists, it is logical that they approached these measures from
standpomt of U.S. national goals and decision makers objectives, developing possible
measures o[ pohtical efiectiveness in their infancy. The decision makers referred
throughout the workshop, as well as throughout this thesis, were assumed to be those
members of the SDIO staff who will recommend development, nondevelopment of the
SDI system, to Congress in 1990. This thesis will present the results of the workshop,
modified to rellect the Soviet political and technological strategy. With these results,
this thesis will attempt to quantify at least one o[ the five Workshop MOPEs,
perception, through a surrogate measure of effectiveness, the success of the Soviet, U.S.
propaganda campaign. Surrogate measures will also be developed for the stability and
leverage MOPEs. with further discussion on means of quantifying each. The expected
outcome, then, of this thesis is at least one quantitative or qualitative measure of
effectiveness, designed to assist the SDI decision makers with the 1990 development
decision. It is imperative to keep in mind that SDI is only a research program at this
time, and if as such it is forcing Soviet responses, political and, or technological, then it
has some measure of effectiveness, simply as a policy making tool. While the political
elTectiveness of a prolonged research program in the area of ballistic missile defense,
without any commitment to development, will eventually fade, it could be sufficient to
convince Congress to allocate appropriate funding, allowing development to follow.
B. THESIS STRUCTURE
The remainder of this thesis will be structured as follows. Chapter 2 will provide
a background on: Soviet contextual, ideological, and political difTerences as they apply
to the Soviet view of deterrence; the So\'iet concept, as opposed to the U.S. concept, of
SDI; and Soviet political/technological responses to SDI. Chapter 3 will present the
current evolution of the MCES methodology. In Chapter 4, the MCES methodology
will be applied to the political aspects of SDI, modifying the workshop results as
necessary to incorporate the Soviet background information presented in Chapter 2.
Tne outcome of this chapter will be five .MOPE's, along with three surrogate measures.
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Chapter 5 will further develop three of the measures presented in Chapter 4, and will
present a means of quantifying these measures. Chapter 6 will contain conclusions and
recommendations.
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II. THE SOVIET VIEW OF DETERRENCE
This chapter is designed to provide background knowledge concerning: the
psychological flictors that affect Soviet militan.- strategy; what the current Soviet
military strategy is; how this affects the Soviet interpretation of SDI; and possible
Soviet political and technological responses to SDI. Several of these issues will be
discussed in greater detail in later chapters.
A. CULTURAL AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Beneath every nation's military strategy, at the most basic level, is the
psychological makeup of the men that determine the strategy. Given a culture and
political system as radically different from curs as the Soviet Union's is, it becomes
even more important to avoid "mirror imaging," particularly when considering a topic
like deterrence. Therefore, in order to fully comprehend the Soviet concept of
deterrence, it is essential to understand the Soviet mentality that produces its miUtary
strategy.
One reason why the U.S. has such great difficulty understanding the Soviet
Union, and therefore the Soviet military' strategy, is that the U.S. and Soviet societies
are based on vastly different contextual concepts. The U.S. society has always been an
individualistic one. Personal goals and a free lifestyle are essential to the American
society. As such, the individualistic nature lends itself to a rather quick decision
making process, in both the civiUan and military arenas. The U.S. society has been
termed a "low - context" society. Conversely, the Soviet society is a collective one,
where interrelationships are o[ key importance. Instead of working towards personal
goals, the Soviet society tends to "pull together" in order to fulfill the larger goals of
socialism. The decision making process is slow, thoughtful, and binding. After a
decision has been made, there is no contention from either the civilian or military-
sectors. The term applied to this type of culture is "high - context" society.
Considering its Marxist - Leninist ideology, it is reasonable that the Soviet Union
is a high - context society, both psychologically and culturally. Everything that is done
in life is done for the good of the collective, whether the collective is merely a village, a
town, or the Communist Party itself Mirror imaging would lead us to believe that the
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actual people of the Soviet Union are very much like the people of the U.S. We
assume the people are loyal Russians, that they love their country, relationships,
villages. In reality, though, the loyalty we perceive is more of a fear of challenging the
political system. In daily life, possibly the strongest feelings are ones of survival, a
desire not to stand out in a crowd. In general, feelings of paranoia pervade. [Ref 3]
These paranoid attitudes are as deeply rooted in the Soviet political system as
they are in daily life. Soviet histor}" is full of attacks from foreigners, but selectively
omits Soviet in\'asions of other lands. The Soviets believe Europe owes its progress to
Russia, for absorbing the Tartan attacks. Likewise, the Soviets see the allied victon.' in
Europe during World War II as being completely due to Russian blood, shed on
Russian soil. Histcrv' has basically been rewritten to ensure the concept of loyalty to
the motherland is passed from generation to generation.
The value of human life is radically difTerent in the Soviet Union. One reason
why survival is essential is that throughout history the Soviets have killed hundreds of
thousands of their own people through purges. Additionally, from the point of view of
the average soldier, schooled from birth in Marxist - Leninist ideology, it is much easier
to die for the survival of the collective than to die as an individual. As a result, the
Soviet soldier is able to perform his duties under conditions of which an American
couldn't dream. Morale is seen not as concerning health, welfare, and attitude of the
individuals comprising the armed forces, as in the U.S., but rather as the ability to
perform the mission in the most adverse situations, including the face of death. At the
same time, while the Soviets appear so callous about the value of human life, they are
appalled by the U.S.'s e.xtensive use of bombing in a wartime situation and the
"useless" deaths of civilians. These attitudes will greatly affect how a war is planned
for, and how those plans are executed.
Two ether areas of perceptual differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
are space, or territory, and tim.e. The question of space translates to what will be
defended in the event of war. To the Soviets, it is clear that the motherland must
survive. The U.S. is more fractionated. Not only do the continental states, Hawaii,
and Alaska need defending, but also U.S. territories and allied nations, particularly
those in the NATO alliance. However, with the clear objective of motherland defense
in mind, the Soviet Union can take the time required to thoroughly plan its strategy
and doctrine. In a high context society like the Soviet Union, there is no time limit.
War is planned for as an event of the future, in such a way that doctrine or strategy
presently being written indicates technology trends for the future.
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Soviet military doctrine is afTected greatly by political culture, space, time, human
life value, history, and survival of the mother Russia. Soviet planners consider these
aspects extensively when determining how to fight a war. While this section provided a
framework for the psychological makeup of those determining the military strategy, the
next section will discuss the actual evolution of modern Soviet militar>' strategy.
B. SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY
Marxist - Leninist ideology is at the very soul of Soviet military strategy. One of
Marx's fundamental beliefs was that all wars are political. The study of war begins
with the study of classes and economic status. War is dictated by poUtics. Marx also
believed that there is a scientific approach to fighting and winning a war. As such, the
Soviets classify wars according to:
1) poUtical nature - just (furthering the spread of communism) or unjust (any
capitalistic provoked war.)
2) class makeup of belligerent sides - all wars are class wars.
3) size of conflict.
4) means of armed struggle [Ref 2: p. 75].
The ideological side of Soviet strategy has changed little since the days of Lenin.
In fact, the only significant changes in Soviet military strategy occurred after the
death of Stalin in 1953. Stalin maintained that the way to win a war was through
conventional strength, meaning a large, well equipped army and a modern nav>^ with
large ships. After his death, though, Khruschev was quick to deemphasize the
conventional aspect of war and shift Soviet military strategy to the nuclear realm.
Marshal Sokolovsky has been credited with wTiting Khruschev's new strategy in his
"Strategia." The major strategic concepts presented by Sokolovsky include:
1) surprise, global, unlimited, short nuclear war
2) theater war escalates quickly to nuclear war
3) no significance of economy of force
4) no partial victory
5) strategic deployment is impossible
6) maneuver only to consolidate victor}'
7) troop control is problematical
S) Soviets have a disadvantage in logistics, weaponry
9) reserves used only to consolidate victor\'
10) strategic offense, surprise nuclear strikes mandatory
11) strategic defense translates to guaranteed defeat [Ref 4.]
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During Breshnev's era, significant strategic changes again occurred in the
concepts of conventional phases and strategic defense. Col. Gen. Gareyev published
these changes in his M.V. FRUNZE: MILITARY THEORIST, arguing that:
1} conventional phase occurs before or after nuclear strike
2) long, conventional phase possible in theater war
3) economy of force necessary for reserves, deterrence
4) partial victory significant since can lead to strategic win
5) strategic deployments necessarv', must be solved
6) rapid, deep maneuver groups required
7) new methods of troop control required
8) logistics/weapons are a Soviet advantage in conventional war
9) reserves are essential echelon back - ups
10) strategic offense should be three dimensional
11) strategic defense is significant [Ref 5.]
The Soviet committment to strategic defense can actually be traced back to two
years after the Cuban missile crisis, when .MAJ GEN Nikolai Talenskii stated that
"when the security of a state is based only on mutual deterrence by means of powerful
nuclear missiles, it is directly dependent on the good will and designs of the other side,
which is a hugely uncertain premise. It would hardly be in the interests of any
peaceloving state to forgo the creation of it's own effective means of defense against
nuclear - missile aggression [Ref 6: p. 16]." Strategic defense, while not considered an
independent wartime mission, is considered to be "an independent form of
combat. ..(and) as an integral part of the broader Soviet 'all - arms' philosophy, which
insists that no single service or weapon can. by itself, secure victory [Ref 6: p. 12]."
The Soviet National Air Defense Forces (PVO), according to Marshal Kulikov, "must
ensure the protection of the countr>' and armed forces from air and nuclear - missile
attack. ..and prevent strikes on the most important objectives [Ref 6; p. 13]."
These published accounts of Soviet strategy give clear evidence that the Soviet
Union f ghts a war in order to win. Whereas the U.S. and NATO will tend either to
fight to a certain point, gaining superiority, then negotiate for peace, or stop fighting
after a nuclear exchange, the Soviet Union plans to begin fighting after the aUied forces
stop. Since the Soviets believe any war between the superpowers will be the final
battle between socialism and capitalism, and therefore will be a fight to the finish in
which nuclear war is inevitable, they have planned their strategy to include a post -
nuclear exchange.
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The key points of Soviet military strategy can be summarized as follows:
1) A war between the West and Soviets will be decisive and for the domination
of the World. The failure of deterrence is inevitable and nuclear escalation
will eventually result.
2) The "Law of Victor.'" is the objective of war.
3) Victory is achieved only by decisively defeating the enemy militarily, by
destroying his armed forces with decisive blows executed according to a single
strategic concept by all available forces and weapons.
4) To win the Soviets must limit damage to the USSR homeland, with
counterforce strikes by strategic defense forces - air, missile, space. ASW. and
civil defense - which are designed to ensure the viability of assets required to
prosecute the war after the first sirike. The U.S./NATO alliance must be
broken.
5) The war may be started by a surprise attack, either conventional or nuclear,
and most likely the war will be brief
6) It would be a just war for the Soviets and an unjust war for the West. While
the Soviets reject the idea of their attacking out of the the blue, they do
believe that victory' in a nuclear war is best ensured by preempting the enemy's
nuclear attack.
7) Victor.' is a feasible outcome of a nuclear war. [Ref 7]
Deterrence, then, in light of the Soviet military strategy, put forth in [Ref 2] and
[Ref 7.] has a different meaning in the U.S. than in the Soviet Union. The U.S. views
deterrence as each side possessing the ability to destroy the other, and therefore neither
will, making deterrence a two - sided effort. As described in [Ref 2.] [Ref 3,] and
[Ref 7,] the Soviets see deterrence as one - sided. The Soviet view of war as never
ending, until capitahsm and its forces have been defeated, dictates that the Soviet
military must make war unprofitable for the coalition of U.S. and NATO forces. The
Soviets, though, have historically seen themselves as technologically inferior to the
Western world, and now maintain the belief that only by achieving superiority in
nuclear and non - nuclear forces can the U.S.; NATO alliance be deterred from
attacking. As described in [Ref 7,] the Soviets see this superiority, and therefore
stability, as attainable only through a constant massing of troops and weapons. Given
the pervading paranoia of Soviet decision makers, it is clear that the Soviets will never
accept that they have attained equanimity, let alone superiority, in the arms race. In
fact, SDI greatly threatens the stability of deterrence from the Soviet point of view, as
will be explained in the next section.
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C. SOVIET VIEW OF SDI
COL M. Sergeyev, writing in AVIATSIYAI KOSMONAVTIKA. the Soviet
equivalent of AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, declared "ihe
aggressive plan to militarize space announced by U.S. President Ronald Reagan
represents a serious danger to mankind. ..according to this sinister strategy, plans to
build a total anti - ballistic missile (.'XBM) defense system are being devised [Ref. 8]."
Obviously the Soviets do not accept SDI as a research or technical feasibility study, as
stated in the President's initial proposal. Rather, the Soviets see SDI as a L.S. attempt
to develop a system that would enable "a nuclear first strike capability against the
Soviet Union [Ref 6: p. 3]." Furthermore, the Soviets discount U.S. claims that SDI is
designed to elliminate the need for nuclear weapons worldwide. Instead, they believe
SDI is "aimed at depriving the Soviet Union of any retaliatory capability, and thus any
deterrent to vouchsafe its own security [Ref 6: p. 5]."
Considering the Soviet inferiority complex, their interpretation of the intent of
SDI could have been anticipated, had Reagan's announcement not surprised both the
U.S. and Soviet buracracies. Beyond the anti - U.S. rhetoric, however, the Soviets are
genuinely threatened by SDI, believing that SDI is an actual weapon system
development project, rather than the research program the U.S. claims it is. This point
of contention is significant since the 1972 AB.VI treaty allows research in the area of
ballistic missile defense. While the Soviets cannot contest this issue, they can and are
protesting any development or testing of an actual SDI system, or system components,
as a blatent treaty violation. The Soviet view is supported m [Ref S] by COL
Sergeyev's description of the SDI system. The article is paraphrased m the following
five paragraphs, as it provides a framework for the Soviet perception of the system that
will drive their political and technological responses.
The Soviet article states that, according to Pentagon strategists, the "space
echelon' of an .ABM defensive system will be assigned the priman.' mission of
destroying targets at several points. Missiles would be destroyed in the powered flight
phase, essentially over the Soviet homeland; in the trajectory phase, where v/arhead
separation occurs; and in the mid - course phase of the flight trajectorv', above the
atmosphere. The degree of effectiveness projected for this system is estimated to
include a ninety nine percent intercept rate of launched warheads. Space weapons
strike systems, based on new physical principles and with advanced means of target
surveillance, tracking, and selection, will be heavily used.
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Based on reports in the foreign press, the Soviets believe the "space echelon" will
be based on orbital combat stations at altitudes ranging from a few hundred to a few
thousand kilometers (km.) Laser and beam weapons, electromagnetic cannons,
conventional warhead missiles and orbital mirrors for the redirection of electromagnetic
waves win be carried on the combat stations. They estimate one hundred orbital
combat stadons. each with the capability of destroying fifty to one hundred targets,
will be sufficient to insure the interception o[ missiles during the powered and mid -
course flight phases. Of these one hundred stations, the Soviets estimate between
fifteen and thirty percent of them will be over enemy territory at any given time. The
remainder will be out of detection range of the intercontinental balUstic missile (ICBVI)
deploym.ent areas, to be used primarily for intercepting submarine launched ballistic
rriissiles (SLBMs) and separate ICBM warheads.
The Soviet article states that an X - ray laser with a nuclear initiator charge that
forms and shapes beamed coherent X - ray emissions will be carried on an orbital
combat station. A system to detect targets and direct the beams to the targets will also
be carried. In addition to the X - ray laser development being conducted at the
Livermore Radiation Laboratory', accelerated efforts are under^vay to develop infrared -
band chemical lasers. The chemical lasers can be used repeatedly, an advantage over
the X - ray lasers, which self- destruct from the the detonation of the nuclear initiator
charge. Plans also exist to test free - electron lasers, to be used in conjunction with a
system of space mirrors.
The article cites development efforts underway at Los Alamos on the
development of space - based accelerator weapons. Beams of neutral particles, possibly
hydrogen particles, produced by compact orbital - based accelerators, will be able to
destroy satellites, ballistic missiles, and their warheads, at ranges inexcess of 1000 km.
By the early 1990's, the accelerator size could be sufficiently reduced to enable its
placement in orbit. In order to destroy warheads in the mid - course phase, the
electromagnetic cannon, based on an electro - dynamic mass accelerator (ED MA) will
be used. A space - based EDMA. weighing between twenty five and one hundred fifty
tons, might be capable of firing one projectile per second. This technology, contracted
to Westinghouse. Aerojet, and General Dynamics, has produced experimental EDMA's
v^'ith accelerated projectiles of up to 4.5 km;s.
The article concludes with brief statements on the use of the Space Shuttle for
orbital placement of the system components and the development of new technology in
18
surveillance, target detection, discrimination, selection, aiming, and guidance of orbital
interceptors. Additionally, comments are made on infrared detectors, highly sensitive
radiometric and spectrometric sensors, optical detecting devices, synthetic - aperture
mjcrowave radars, and ultra - violet detection and ranging equipment to perform target
tracking and selection. [Ref S]
While the article is certainly not the most accurate portrayal of ongoing research
in the SDI field, it is significant for several reasons. First, it publicly states the Soviet
view of SDI technology being explored. Second, it relates research development
projects that, when operational, will be clearly in violation of the ABM treaty. The
Soviet culture, which has a way of rationalizing their own Illegal etTorts. may accept
this research as a validation of their own treaty breaking programs. Finally, is provides
the framework for the technological and political responses discussed in the next
sections.
D. SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY RESPONSES
This section provides background information on actual and predicted Soviet
technological responses to a greater perceived threat from the U.S. The information is
provided primarily as an indication of actual Soviet intentions, despite their rhetoric.
The Soviet Union is clearly "not sitting idly by while the U.S. strives to gain strategic
superiority IRef 6]."
Given the SDI conceptual background, a great deal of speculation on or
interpretation of Soviet responses could be undertaken. However, in an attempt to
focus on the ongoing development efforts ^^ith ties to the SDI research program, this
section will discuss the following technological and militarv' responses, grouped into the
following categories by [Ref 9.] The categories are: emulation of U.S. defensive
capabilities; evasion of selected SDI components, including passive means; and
rendering U.S. SDI ineffective by active means. It should be noted that, while all o[
these are possible responses, they are not all equally likely. Speculation by U.S.
analysts does not necessarily consider the Soviet view of deterrence, or the avowed
position that the Soviets uill not let the U.S. determine their rmlitar>' budget.
1. Emulation of LI.S. Defensive Capabilities
a. Space - based Components, Especially DABM
Moscow's determination to match any U.S. use of space for expanded
strategic defense purposes justifies, in their minds, Soviet efforts to procure a major
space - based defensive system. The Soviet defensive antiballistic missile (DABM)
19
system, however, would be difTerent from SDI for several reasons. U.S. quality control
and technological superiority would be most evident in the space arena. Some
estimates predict the Soviet D.ABM system would have more of a manned component.
Secondly, the ballistic missile threats of the two systems are different. While the U.S.
ICBM force is less fractionated than the Soviet Rocket Force, the U.S. SLBM threat is
highly \nR\'ed, and Trident II will provide ICBM like accuracy and range, combined
with the appearance of possibly twenty deployed missile fields, in separate locations.
Unless U.S. offensive posture radically changes before ihe turn of the centur\', the
Soviets are expected to pursue a kinetic energy type D.A.BM. Since a necessarv'
corollar\" to DABM would be a capabihty to imniediately track missile plumes with a
high degree o[ accuracy, the problem of partially unloading an SLBM would be
aggravated. [Ref 9]
One other space - based component worthy of discussion is the antisatellite
(ASAT.) While the Soviet Union goes to great efforts to demonstrate that the U.S. is
involved in more than research for SDI, typically citing the ongoing testing of the F -
15 ASAT prototype, they neglect to mention their own pacesetting work in ASAT
technology, and specifically that they currently maintain the only existing operational
ASAT. In fact, "the Soviet Union has had an operational capability to intercept and
destroy satellites in low orbit since the 1970's [Ref 6]." The Soviet ASAT is coorbital,
usually requiring one to four orbits to position itself near the target, therefore taking
between one and five hours to achieve lethal positioning. It then detonates, similar to
a space mine. While it is purportedly behind the U.S. in technology, it is deployed on
two launch sites at the Tyuratam Missile Test Center, and does pose a threat to low
earth orbiting satellites.
b. Defense against U.S. Air - Breathing Theats
In the area o^ defense against U.S. air - breathing threats, all publicly
available evidence suggests that the Soviet IL - 76 based air defense system Mainstay is
much less capable than either the E - 3A Sentry or the E - 2C Hawkeye. The
Mainstay has been compared to the EC - 121 early warning system, rather than to a
second generation AWACS system. Given this, the main technical changes facing
Soviet air defenses are : reduced signatures; increased penetrativity and standoff range
posed by missile carr\'ing aircraft; and increasingly deadly defense suppression
capabilities. The use of air defense lasers, veiw long - range interceptors and SAMs,
and high value interceptors, all of which are currently in development, uill help in the
fulfillment of these goals. [Ref 9]
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c. Ground Based ABM Capabilities
While the Soviet Union is quick to criticize the U.S. SDI research program,
they neglect to point out that their own ABM program has been ongoing since 1957.
Khruschev stated in September 1961 that "at the same time we told our scientists and
engineers to develop intercontinental rockets, we told another group to work out a
means to combat such rockets [Ref. 6]." Initial tests of the first - generation Soviet
AB.VI began in 1957, the same year the Soviet Union launched its first ICBM.
Marshall .VlaUnovskii announced at that 22nd Party Congress that "the problems o^
destroying missiles in flight. ..has been successfully solved" [Ref 6.]
The Breshnev regime authorized full - scale development o'l an ABM site
around Moscow, and by 1968, the Soviet Union could claim the world's first
functioning ABM. with the initial operation capability of the GALOSH system.
Construction, however, was stopped with Soviet interest in Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) with the United States, and indications are that there were serious
doubts about the operational prospects of GALOSH, specifically when compared to
the U.S. more sophisticated, two - layered ABM based on Spartan and Sprint. (The
U.S. Mickelson ABM complex at Grand Forks, South Dakota, was dismantled in 1975,
soon after completion, due to cost constraints.) Construction was resumed in 1971 on
the Moscow ABM and, prior to the conclusion of SALT I, it was deployed with si.xty
four launchers. The system consisted of the ABM - IB, deployed around Moscow in
four complexes o^ sixteen reloadable launchers. The reload capability, however, was so
slow that it would not be of much use in combat. The Moscow ABM system provided
a single - layered defense of the Moscow NCA against a light ballistic missile attack.
Despite the deactivation of half the launchers in recent years, the system has
undergone constant technological upgrades since 1980, and when completed, will ofTer
a two layered defense consisting of a total of one hundred improved ABM - 1
exoatmospheric interceptors and AB.VI - X - 3 endoatmospheric interceptors, both of
which will be silo based with an expected reload capability. [Ref 6]
The Moscow ABM system is supported by an extensive layered warning
network. The first level is composed of missile launch detection satellites that can
provide up to thirty minutes warning of impending attack. The second level consists of
a line of over - the - horizon (OTH) radars directed toward U.S. ICBM fields. This
level can also provide up to thirty minutes warning. Both systems are backed up by six
peripheral phased array radars for attack characterization. Additionally, construction
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is underway on a large phased array radar in Siberia to fill any holes in the existing
coverage capability.
Soviet testing of the SA - 10 and SA - X - 12 missiles suggest possible
ABM apphcations, and while they do not provide a significant threat to U.S. ICBMs
because of their limited capability against high speed reentry- targets, they could be able
to intercept SLBM warheads that are slower and present larger radar signatures. The
SA - X - 12 has been successfully tested against the Soviet SS - 4 Medium Range
Ballistic Missile (MRBM.) [Ref 6]
Along with the pioneering work in the ABM field, the Soviet Union has
shov\Ti considerable interest in the long term potential of lasers and directed energy.
LCOL O. Andreev stated in "Possible Military and other uses of Lasers," published in
1965, that "if a method of focusing large amounts of energy over considerable distances
IS developed, it will be possible to resolve many scientific and technical questions, and
especially the problem of destroying intercontinental missies [Ref. 6]."
Soviet laser research can be traced to at least the early 1960's. The USSR
currently maintains approximately six research and development facilities and test
ranges dedicated exclusively to laser research. Intelligence reports indicate work, on gas
dynamic, electnc discharge, and chemical lasers, and their potential weapons
applications A ground based laser exists at the Sary Shagan B.VID test center, capable
of interfering with U.S. sateUites in low earth orbits [Ref 6.] In addition to the laser
development efforts, the Soviets have ongoing research into kinetic energy concepts
with a potential BMD role.
d. Other Areas
Additional areas of emulation are Civil Defense, anti - submarine and ami -
maritime capabilities, and special forces attacks. Of these, civil defense and special
forces are the most significant. .A comprehensive civil defense plan currently exists for
the Moscow area, and while it would need significant revision, would enable the
Soviets to regroup even after the efTects of SDI. The Soviet Union enjoys a
tremendous advantage, compared to the U.S., in the areas of population protection (by
a combination of sheltering and dispersal,) industrial hardening, and redundancy,
therefore allowing the nation the survive "a major nuclear campaign uith significant
percentages of leadership, military control, and labor forces intact, even in the face o{
deliberate U.S. responsive targeting strategies [Ref. 9]." Despite the fact that the U.S.
has an advantage m the areas of transportation, food, and medical supply availability,
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our low - context society would yield individual civil defense plans rather than
collective.
Given the nature of security surrounding the perimeters of the Soviet
Union and United States, the Special Forces of the Soviet Union would have a greater
advantage in the area of border penetration, weapons infiltration, and peacetime covert
or terrorist type operations [Ref 9.] Covert forces could then gain access to U.S.
defensive forces prior to their deployment, in line with the Soviet preemption strategy.
Considerable speculation has been made concerning the possible Soviet covert role in
the launch problems plaguing the U.S. space program.
2. Evasion of Selected SDI Components, Inchiding Passive Means
a. Neutralizing a Joint U.S. OffensejSDI Posture
Since the Soviets believe the U.S. will launch a first strike and that SDI is
not a defensive system, they seek, to escape this scenario in several ways. These
include: a propaganda campaign during SDI development culminating in program
delay or cancellation; concealment of the location, number, and type of offensive
forces; superhardening, mobility, and concealment; active defense of Soviet offensive
forces; preemptive attack against U.S. offenses/defenses, particularly as SDI is being
deployed; and the adoption of a launch - on warning doctrine. [Ref 9]
b. Evading SDI with Long Range Missiles!Alternate Attack Means
SDI can also be evaded by Soviet employment of a program to combine
ICBM hardening; the used of decoys, chaff, and aerosols; rotation of boosters during
climb out phase; increasing reflectivity of boosters; fast booster burn; depressed
trajectories; fractional orbits; and many others. The possibility also exists that
alternate delivery concepts not vulnerable to the boost phase intercept defense now
envisioned could be developed. The Soviets appear to be moving in this direction with
the development of single RV mobile ICBVIs, new sea - based ballistic missiles, the
Blackjack bomber, and air and sea - based cruise missiles. [Ref 9]
c. Evading SDI as a Whole
A final way of evading SDI by passive means is proliferating offensive
forces. If developing a defense system costs too much, given the already strained
Soviet economy, the Soviets might opt instead to buy enough extra weapons to render
SDI less effective.
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3. Rendering SDI Ineffective by Active Means
a. Interfering with SDI Deployment
Since the deployment of such a complex system as SDI will take
considerable time, there will be a period during which major gaps in defense will exist.
Durmg this time. Soviet attacks as a part of a preventive campaign could be expected,
as their militan.' strategy allows for preemptive strikes. The possibility o[ an all out
nuclear attack, hou-ever. is slim, but cannot be discounted. Attacks on U.S. space
launch facilities would be feasible, as well, and could conceivably already be underway.
Attacks on key facilities during the acquisition phase would also be possible, as would
co\'ert attacks on antennas, radars, propellant facilities, assembly areas, etc.. which
could be sufficiently masked to prevent being traced back to the Soviet Union, thereby
evading U.S. reprisals. [Ref 9] Perhaps the most likely interference from the Soviet
Union would be ASAT or space mune attacks on research and development platforms
durmg the SDI testing phase. These attacks would deter or greatly inhibit deployment.
The expected U.S. response, in the eyes of the Soviets, would be nil. since no human
lives would be involved.
b. Supressing U.S. Defensive Weapon Satellites
While this type of action is a function of the particular type oi' weapons
platforms deployed, it is reasonable to expect some "hole - poking" in the defense. If
the weapons are only operational over intended targets, the Soviets could disable part
of the DAB.M constellation and then exploit these gaps by launching strikes through
the holes. [Ref 9]
c. Other Possibilities
Other possible areas of actively defeating SDI prior to its full deployment
are highly speculative. However, such areas as disrupting battle management,
comm.and and control; the gradual degradation of U.S. strategic defenses; disrupting
SDI exercises; diverting SDI assets away from strategic defense: and sabotage [Ref 9]
could be exploited by the Soviet Union with existing or future technology.
E. SOVIET POLITICAL RESPONSES TO SDI
The very nature of the Soviet closed society makes it difficult for the West to
learn of Soviet political shifts. However, the Soviets, uncharacteristically, have been
overwhelmingly vocal about SDI, enabling some measure of the Soviet political
response to be made. This section will provide background information on the trends
24
observed so far concerning the areas of propaganda, economics, technological
infeasabilities for the U.S., and arms control negotiations. In later chapters, the
application of the MCES to the overall SDI political issues, with several of these issues
e.xpanded upon as necessarv', will yield possible measures of political effectiveness.
1. Soviet Propaganda Campaign
By far the most observable Soviet response to SDI has been their propaganda
campaign. The Soviets have mounted an almost unprecedented anti - SDI propaganda
campaign, aimed at destroying SDI in the conceptual phase, prior to its becoming a
tangible threat. The campaign is designed not only to "foment domestic opposition to
SDI both within and outside the U.S. defense community," but also to drive a wedge
between the U.S. and NATO allies [Ref 6: p. 39].
For the Americans, the Soviet propaganda barrage is playing on our
traditional peacetime values and anti - military sentiments. The United States has,
throughout iiistor}', been a nation that almost completely demobilizes after a major
war, only to arm ourselves again in the face of the next major crisis. Some sectors of
the American public have already had great diiTiculty accepting Reagan's massive
military growth programs. Taking advantage of this, Soviet propagandists have
exploited the SDI research program, going to great lengths to prove that the program
has gone beyond research, thereby constituting a violation of the 1972 ABM treaty
[Ref 6: p. 6]. Additionally, recognizing the American public's acceptance of "arms
control" as an inherently good concept, the Soviets have caused dissent by stating that
SDI will bring the world closer to nuclear war through an "intensified arms race
alTecting the stability of the strategic balance [Ref 6: p. 4]." Such rhetoric has resulted
in significant public questioning on whether SDI really is a system to develop world
peace or whether it will instead lead to world instability.
While the Soviet's American propaganda campaign is designed to appeal to
the publics conscience, the European campaign is designed to misrepresent SDI in
order to incite the fears of the NATO allies. In addition to providing publicity to
American SDI critics like Kostas Tsipis, Carl Sagan, Hans Bethe, and Paul Warnke
[Ref 6: p. 7]. the Soviets are repeatedly publicizing European concerns that an
effective ABM system will decouple the U.S. nuclear deterrent from Europe's defense.
Vladimjr Bogachev stated in TASS that the Europeans would pay a "dark price, while
the U.S., under the umbrella of a space - based ABM system would survive
Armageddon [Ref 6: p. 7]." Another Soviet author, Valentin Falin, pointed out that
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SDI conviently ignores the tactical and operational, implying theater, nuclear weapons,
because these threats do not "pain American hearts [Ref. 6: p. 7]." The Soviet
propaganda barrage not only emphasizes European vulnerability because of the SDI
umbrella, but amplifies the threat by indicating that involvement with SDI will
threaten Europe's "good relations" with the Soviet Union [Ref. 6: p. 39]. It should be
noted, however, that the Soviets are approaching the European campaign carefully,
remembering the backfiring of the Soviet campaign against the INF deployments.
A more sophisticated, subtle propaganda scheme is being conducted with the
goal of portraying Prime Minister Gorbachev as a Soviet version of John F. Kennedy.
Gorbachev has openly stated, contrar\' to all observable technological and strategic
policy trends, that the Soviets have forsworn interest in strategic defense and accepted
MAD as the basis for Soviet security. Gorbachev has announced plans for a new
"openness" in the Soviet Union, but has yet to take any decisive action along those
lines. Additionally, Gorbachev and his wife are being treated as celebrities, role
m.odels. and basically as the vogue political couple of the decade. These actions are
designed to lull the U.S. (and their NATO allies) into a state of mirror imaging, where
we see the Soviets to be like us, respecting arms control and seeking peace.
2. Economic Factors
The current econoinic situation of the Soviet Union must be considered as one
of the driving forces behind any response to SDI. The Gorbachev administration has
identified economic reform as one of its most urgent priorities. Indeed, reform is
imperative if the Soviet Union plans to remain a competitive superpower in the next
centur}' [Ref 6: p. 4S]. After twenty years, the Soviets must now accept that there are
"real limits' to attainable milltar}' grouth [Ref 6: p. 3].
As such, SDI threatens the twenty year investment the Soviets have made in
hard - target ICBM deployment, because it increases the uncertainty of the success of
those missiles. The comprehensive nature of SDI may force the already strained Soviet
resources to be allocated in defensive directions, since cheaper solutions like increasing
the number of warheads on ICBMs would not provide enough confidence to ensure the
continued Soviet advantage required by their definition of deterrence. SDI also
threatens the research and development budget of the Soviet Union, since it poses a
significant technological challenge that the Soviets may or may not be in a position to
meet.
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While the economic pressures cannot be completely denied, the Soviets are
stressing that they will not allow SDI to force a "military* investment path preferred for
us by the United States." but will instead respond to SDI with a view to their own
security interests [Rcf. 6: p. 3S]. Georgii Arbatov has stated in an interview in the Los
Angeles Times that "we have lo increase our armaments, and we won't go the way the
Americans want us to go. spending just as much money as you do on nothing in a
mirror image of your efforts. We will work on weapons to counter this SDI [Ref 6: p.
38]." Regardless of the direction of spending, whether offensive or defensive in nature.
a viable SDI system will force the already overtaxed Soviet economy to spend even
more m order to counter the increased threat.
3. Arms Control Negoliations
SDI can be held out as a bargaining chip by either side in future negotiations.
From the Soviet point of view, the ABM treaty can be exploited to the fullest, in order
to prevent testing of the SDI system, or its components, thereby limiting the amount
of U.S. confidence in the ability o[ the costly system's capabilities. The Soviets could
work, towards prohibiting deployments by comparing SDI to an .ASAT system, and
therefore subjecting certain components to .ASAT restrictions. Finally, by exploiting
the conllict between Reagan's announcement that SDI will remove the need for nuclear
weapons, and his major offensive force buildup, the Soviets might elect to limit U.S.
offensive growth and allow the possibly futile SDI research to continue [Ref 9: p. 4S].
On the other hand, the U.S. has openly stated that research and testing
permitted by the ABM treaty will not be negotiated. Arms control experts, though,
m.ust recognize the potential value of making concessions in SDI, subjecting Soviet
AB.M research and development to those same constraints, while imposing constraints
on Soviet ICBM development in the areas of improved accuracy and increased MIRV
fractionation, not to mention verification [Ref 6: p. 44).
4. Wait and See
The U.S. has a histor}' of inabilities to sustain defensive initiatives over a long
period o[ time, due to changing administrations, multiple budgetary- cycles, lack oi^
public support, and complex technology. The Reagan administration will be out of
office in 1988. and is currently facing severe defense budget pressures from the
Democratic Congress and Senate. The SDI budget has already sufTered cutbacks at
the hands of the Gramm - Rudman - HoUings amendment. A possible, though
unlikely, response given the paranoid Soviet political culture would be for the Soviet
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Union to simply wait and see if SDI continues to be a threat in 1988. This would
allow Soviet econonrdc reforms to continue without the stress of responding, possibly
needlessly, to the SDI program. This is unlikely, though, since Soviet mirror imaging
would suggest that a system with as much potential as SDI would be above budgetary-
problems. In the Soviet Union, despite the great economic hardships faced by the
public, a potential system hke SDI would enjoy almost limitless funding. The Soviets,
looking for a way to rationalize their own phenomenal military spending, would
probably project the same attitudes on the U.S. SDI program.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented several factors contributing to the Soviet view of
deterrence and ultimately the Soviet view of SDI. Current and predicted Soviet
political and technological solutions to SDI have also been examined, in order to
demonstrate that SDI has indeed provoked a measurable response. This background
information will be incorporated into the analysis of SDIs political etTectiveness in
Chapter 4, as the methodology described in the next chapter is applied.
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III. MCES BACKGROUND
A. WHAT IS THE MCES?
In the book MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS. Blaise Pascal is quoted as saying "I
find as impossible to know the parts without knowing the whole, as to know the whole
without knowing the parts [Ref. 10: p. 3]." Additionally, MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
contrasts the systems approach, or viewing of the problem as a whole, with the
analytical method, or segmenting the whole into smaller parts to provide better
understanding of the whole. The Modular Command and Control Evaluation
Structure (MCES) is an analytical system that provides a greater understanding of the
overall problem. Generically speaking, the MCES can be seen as:
1) a structure to direct the evaluation of C2 architectures;
2) a paradigm to select and integrate from among existing tools;
3) a methodology which itself m.ay be used for evaluation, employing a common
structured treatment [Ref 11: p. 6].
The MCES is an evolving tool that claims to "expedite the analytic foundations
for system design requirements, interface and interoperability documents, critical issues
reports, operational concepts, and prototype and full system evaluations [Ref 12]."
The MCES is described as having two components. The first, a managerial system,
focuses on the complete specification of the problem to be solved. By doing so, it
eases the burden on the decision maker by enhancing direction and reducing the time
and personnel needed for further analysis of the problem. The second component, an
analytical system, "identifies, integrates and coordinates appropriate methodologies for
the solution of the specified problem [Ref 12]," enabling analysts using the tool to
provide supporting data (in this case MOPE's) to the decision maker.
The MCES is composed of seven "modules:" problem formulation system
bounding; process definition; integration of statics and dynamics; specification o[
measures; data generation; and aggregation of measures. Each module will be
discussed separately, of the Appendix shows the MCES structure, with each module
identified. [Ref 11]
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B. MODULE 1: PROBLEM FORMULATION
Module 1. problem formulation, addresses the question of the decision makers
needs and objectives in a specific problem. For a military system, these could include
the concept definition and development, system design, acquisition, operations, the
lifecycle of a military (C2) system, and the level of analysis prescribed [Ref 11: p. 11].
The output of this module is a more precise statement of the problem being addressed.
Once accomplished, the problem statement can be translated into objectives. These
objectives need to be identified as "real" goals or "stated" goals, and when identified,
need to be operationalized. The appropriate threat, operational and deployment
concepts, scenarios and underlying assumptions in the evaluation are made clear in this
module. .A.ppendi.\ Figure 2 depicts the expanded problem formulation module
[Ref 11.]
C. MODULE 2: C2 SYSTEM BOUNDING
Module 2 is the systems bounding block, used for identifying relevant quantities
including:
1) physical entities, (equipment, software, people, and their associated facilities)
2) structure (organization, concepts of operation, including procedures and
protocols, and information How patterns)
3) C2 process (the functionality or what the system is doing) [Ref. 11: p. 12]."
4) Boundaries of the subsystem, system, own forces, environment, and rest of
world.
The module focuses on the physical entities and structure, resulting in the
identification and categorization of the system elements of the problem formulated in
Module 1. Figure 3 of the Appendix depicts the expanded systems bounding module.
Figure 4 of the Appendix depicts the "onion skin" that describes the MCES systems
bounding. The onion skin breaks the system into environment, forces. C2 system,
subsystem, and element. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS relates boundaries to the
environment by stating "...the boundan.' demarcates the system from its environment
[Ref 10]." The environment includes evervihing outside the system's control and
e\er}'thing that determines how the system performs.
D. MODULE 3: PROCESS DEFINITION
Module 3, the process definition module, takes a given system configuration (i.e.
a specific scenario and mission) and defines the processes needed to fulfill the mission.
It maps the processes needed to a Lawson - like loop system configuration, shown in
Figure 5 of the Appendix. The concept focuses attention on the:
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1) "the environmental initiator of the C2 process, which results from a change
from the desired state
2) the internal C2 process functions that characterize what the system is doing
(sense, assess, generate, select, plan, and direct)
3) the input to and output from the internal C2 process and environment,
including enemy forces, own/neutral forces, and usual environmental
components [Ref 11: p. 19]."
Figure 6 the of Appendix represents the expanded process definition module.
E. MODULE 4: INTEGRATION OF STATICS AND DYNAMICS
Module 4. the integration of statics and dynamics module, relates the data /
information fiow and process functions to the organizational structure as well as
relating the physical entities to the process functions. The terms statics and dynamics
address the various architectures that are being analyzed. Statics refer to the physical
entities and structure, since the structure changes very slowly over time. Dynamics,
then, can be compared to the process function, which changes rapidly [Ref 11; p. 40].
The flow through the C2 process model can be depicted through the use of Petri Nets,
Dara Structure Diagrams (DSDs) or Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) [Ref 11: p. 16].
Considering the specific application of the MCES in this thesis, though, DFDs are
more appropriate. Input/output fiow arrows identify information fiow to and from the
separate process functions, as required by the specific mission. The information flows
result in "hierarchical relationships between the individual C2 functions. ..resulting m a
hierarchical structure. ..of the information fiow [Ref 11: p. 16]." From that point, an
organizational structure can be derived, followed by those physical entities which
perform functions being mapped to the output. This process results in "a synthesis o^
the statics and dynamics defining a C2 system." Figure 7 of the Appendix is a diagram
of the expanded integration module.
F. MODULE 5: SPECIFICATION OF MEASURES
Module 5, the specification of measures or criteria module, tracks the four prior
modules in order to specify the measures necessary to address the problem of interest.
Table 1 taken from [Ref 11: p. 19], provides a Ust of desired characteristics for
evaluation measures, along with definitions of these characteristics, used in order to
produce a reasonable set of "possible" working measures of effectiveness.
From these working measures, one or more measures, suitable to the specific
problem and or the data collection system, are identified, becoming the "critical" or
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TABLE 1


















can be computed or estimated
can be assigned numbers or
ranked
relates realistically to the
C2 system and associated
uncertainties
can be defined or derived,
independent of subjective
relates to acceptable standards
and analysis objectives
reflects changes in system
variables
reflects those standards
required by analysis objectives
is mutually exclusive with
respect to other measures
is easily understood by the
user
minimum essential set of measures for the problem at hand. The fmal set of measures
selected are classified as to their level of measurement, i.e., "measures of performance
(MOPs.) measures of effectiveness (MOEs.) measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs)
[Ref 11: p. 20], or measures of policy etTectiveness (MOPEs.)" The names chosen also
link, to the kind of conclusion that can be drawn in an analysis to which the measures
are applied [Ref 11: p. 20|. The outcome of this module is the specification of a set of
measures based on the C2 process functions or static components [Ref 11: p. 21].
Figure 8 of the Appendix represents the expanded specifications module.
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G. MODULE 6: DATA GENERATION
Module 6 encompasses data generation by exercise, simulation, experiment,
and,'or subjective judgements. The data generator, for the specifice problem, outputs
values associated with the measures specified in Module 5, which are either direct or
derived values [Ref. 11: p. 21].
Some suggested SDI data generation techniques include: the Delphi method, as
a means o[ determining risk in a variety of dimensions, such as alTordability. time
constraints, domestic tranquility; formal security modeling and evaluations;
clandestine vulnerability analyses; operational communications accreditation via
appropriate agencies; security related test and evaluation; scenario exercises; and
technology validation. Figure 9 in the Appendix shows the expanded data generation
module.
H. MODULE 7: AGGREGATION OF MEASURES
VIodule 7 is the aggregation of measures and interpretaion module. "The
implementation of this module provides the analysis results addressing the "specific
problem initially posed by the decision maker in the problem formulation module
[Ref 11: p. 22]." Module 7. taken together with Modules 5 and 6. provides a means
for determining that the plans are being executed as originally conceived. If not, they
should also provide a way for determining where the problem or change occurred.
Appendix Figure 10 depicts the expanded aggregation module.
I. SUMMARY: WHY THE MCES?
There are several advantages to using the MCES as an analytical structure that
make it a more appropriate choice for the evaluation of the political etlectiveness of
SDI. Given the complex nature of the SDI issue, along with the changing political and
budgetan.' situations SDI is facing, the fact that the MCES allows interaction by the
decision maker at any point in the analysis is a great advantage, as it provides the
identification of errors in assumptions, bounding, etc. Additionally, the MCES v/ill
provide an explicit statement of underlying assumptions, while forcing a set of standard
definitions within the SDI community. Finally, as will be seen in the next two
chapters, the MCES does provide a framework for deriving and measuring the
effectiveness of SDI as a political concept, along with bringing out future requirem.ents
in order for that effectiveness to be maintained.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MCES TO THE OVERALL SDI ISSUES
A. INTRODLCTION
In order to determine the efTectiveness of SDI. both politically and
technologically, a methodology needed to be chosen. The MCES, discussed in the
preceding chapter, afforded analysis capabilities applicable not only to the policy goals
and ensuant measures, but also to the engineering and system goals and m.easures. .As
such, it was the logical choice of methodology for the 1986 SDI Measures of
Effectiveness Workshop.
This chapter will tie Chapters 2 and 3 together, with the application of the
.MCES to the political policy goals of SDI, taking into consideration the Soviet
ideolog\' that led to the Soviet concept of deterrence. As each module is applied, the
process \\'ill be discussed first from the point of view of what was accomplished at the
1986 workshop by the policy/overall SDI working group, whose members were
identified in Chapter 1. Secondly, the results of the workshop will be amended or
modified as required, when the Soviet background information presented in Chapter 2
is incorporated into the aalysis. The working group members, drawing on personal
experience and taking advantage of the diversity of their backgrounds, reviewed each
generic module and then applied it to the SDI political concept. After considerable
group discussion, and with Dr. Rona's guidance, a concensus was reached concerning
the output of each module. It is that concensus that will be presented in this thesis.
.At this point, it should be noted that Modules 6 and 7. data generation and
aggregation of measures, were not applied at the workshop, due to time constraints.
These two modules will not be specifically applied in this thesis, either, because of
resource constraints. However. Modules 6 and 7 will be discussed and possible
applications anticipated results presented, as well as recommendations for future
studies in this area.
B. MODULE 1: PROBLEM FORMULATION
1. Workshop Results
Module 1. the problem form.ulation block, addresses the question of the
decision niaker's needs and objectives in a specific problem. In terms of the SDI
workshop, the first difficult task facing the working group members was the
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determination of exactly what the decision makers really want the overall SDI system
to do. Drawing on the decision making experience of the more senior working group
members, and addressing the question as if each working group member was on the
decision making SDIO staff, several assumptions were made framing the overall SDI
program, in order to facilitate the problem formulation:
1) SDI was assumed to be a generically difierent system from any other weapon
system developmient program because: it attempts to modify Soviet strategy,
doctrine, and behavior: the "threat" SDI responds to is generalized and
includes large scale Sosiet tactics; and SDI is a multi - service, multi - agency
system.
2) The evaluation criteria at any level may need different emphasis for different
e\'clutionaiw phases of the ultimate operational system.
3) Because of its nature, SDI must interact directly with top level national goals.
4) The SDI research program itself is feasible, affordable, and will be productive
enough to provide technology that reinforces the political threat.
5) The SDI research and development program will be compatible with existing
treaties.
6) SDI not only represents a major change in U.S. strategy, but that change will
be accepted by our allies and the Soviet Union, and, once accepted, will make
a safer world.
7) Finally, a hypothetical baseline architecture, measurable and representative o[
the future SDI system, can be defined.
Using their list of framing assumptions, the working group members developed
a list o[ objectives/criteria, as an extension of the previous Ust, by which the decision
maker would judge the political effectiveness of SDI. This list included:
Popular support of U.S. and allied public, as this will influence the available
funding.
Early availability to ensure continued interest given the historv' of U.S. long
term technology programs. It is easier to sell a product if that product
physically exists.
Credibility of SDI to the U.S. population, morally as well as technically.
Low technology risk in order to ensure continued interest and to foster a "can
do attitude.
High visibility to the Soviets to demonstrate U.S. committment to strategic
defense.
Incentive to Soviets to switch from MAD to defense in order to control the
arms race.
Support of allies in the areas of funding, political support.
Create uncertainty for Soviet planners, forcing a change in strategy.
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Compatibility with arms control treaties, since U.S. policy makers and public
see these as legally and morally bmdmg.
AiTordability in the eyes of the population and Congress.
ElTective city defense as a means of ensuring population survival.
EtTective rmlitar>' target defense as a means of ensuring a second strike
capability.
Multiple engagement eflectivencss to protect against a Soviet second strike.
No collateral U.S. damage demonstrating that SDI really will defend.
Crisis stability, both domestic and international, particularly after a nuclear
exchange.
Transient phase stability, to defend the U.S. during the transition from MAD to
defense.
Compatibility with NCA structure to ensure the C3 system functions operate
smoothly under wartime conditions.
While some of these objectives clearly relate to the technological development aspects
of SDI, others are clearly politically motivated, and are of greater interest to this thesis,
as will be seen in later sections.
2. Effects of Soviet Ideology and New Results
Considering the Soviet background information provided in Chapter 2, three
of the assumptions made by the working group, as well as two objectives that evolved
from those assumptions, need modification. The remaining assumptions and objectives
are valid after the analysis of the Soviet background information. First. SDI was
assumed to be a generically different weapon system because it attempts to modify
Soviet strategy, doctrine, and behavior. The basic Soviet strategy of ensuring Soviet
and socialist survival by deterring the enemy through an overwhelming ability to defeat
the enemy has not changed since the days of Lenin. What has changed is the means of
carrying out that doctrine - from conventional might to nuclear might to a
conventional/nuclear mix. As stated in Chapter 2, the Soviets have firmly stated that
they will not allow the U.S. to drive Soviet strategy through the SDI research program.
A more appropriate assumption, then, would be that SDI is an attempt to modify
Soviet economic and military behavior.
The second assumption requiring modification states SDI will be compatible
with existing arms control treaties. Due to the vast cultural and political differences
between the U.S and Soviet Union, the ABM treaty, as well as others in question,
have dilTerent meanings dependent upon interpretation. Each countrv^ will derive their
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own meaning as to what is and is not permitted, manipulating words, phrases, and
clauses as required in order to support the desired position. The clause the U.S.
interprets as allowing certain kinds of research and development can be interpreted by
the Soviets as prohibiting the same. This assumption, then, should be rephrased to say
that SDI will be compatible with U.S. Allied interpretations of the treaties.
Finally, the assumption was made that SDI not only represents a major
change in U.S. strategy, but that the Soviets will also accept this change and a safer
world will result. While from the U.S. perspective this is a logical conclusion, it is
completely opposite all known Soviet views. Not only have the Soviets ncN'er accepted
MAD as strategy, they have blatently stated that SDI will force them to search for
alternate means of defeating the system, in order to continue deterrence from the
Soviet point of view. Again, this assumption should be modified to include the
possibility that the Soviets may or may not accept the change in strategy, but the
decision makers are willing to take the risk an\"vvay.
Two objectives require modification. The objective "incentive for Soviets to
shift from MAD to defense" is, given the avowed Soviet position, unrealistic. What
SDI can do, though, is cause a Soviet search for an alternate means of deterrence,
therefore creating greater economic strain and even dissention in the military leadership
as the new course of action is contemplated. The objective should then be rewritten as
"economic strain, government confusion as responses to SDI are pursued." The second
objective requiring modification is "compatibility with arms control treaties." As stated
in tiie paragraph on the assumption that led to this objective, it should be reworded to
indicate "compatibility with arms control treaties and U.S. /Allied interpretation o[ the
treaties."
As stated above, the remainder of the assumptions and objectives identified by
the working group are vaUd after the inclusion of Chapter 2 information. Having
completed the problem formulation m.odule. the next step is to apply module 2. the
systems bounding block.
C. MODULE 2: SYSTEMS BOUNDING
1. Workshop Results
Module 2 is the systems bounding block, and is used for identifying relevant
quantities, inculding physical entities, structure, and boundaries of the subsystem,
system, own forces, environment, and rest of the world. The efibrt to bound the
sy^^tem at the SDI workshop stemmed from one of the assumptions made during the
problem formulation module. It was assumed that a hypothetical baseline architecture,
measurable and representative oi^ the future SDI system, could be defmed. Further
defining this abstract concept, the working group developed a definition and purpose o[
the baseline architecture. It was defined as a means of specifying the system's
functional objectives by:
1) providing a broad description of the "family of systems" assembled for a
common purpose
2) existing at a level above the more technical "engineering description"
3) including ail major consutuents and functional relationships
4) and providing for future e\'olutionar>' features.
The purpose o[ the architecture is twofold. First, it should communicate to the
decision makers the \'alue or merit of the proposed concept in terms of the goals and
objectives identified through Module 1. Second, but equally important, the
hypothetical baseline architecture should offer a framework to the system and
functional level definition of evaluation criteria, thereby enabling the system to be
bound.
When the working group, after generically defining the hypothetical baseline
architecture and its purpose, began the task of actually putting the architecture onto
paper, a discussion lasting several hours ensued, with no concensus ever being reached
beyond the essential constituents of the architecture. The essential constituents were
identified as being:
1) the mission objectives and tasks for various conflict scenarios
2) the functions to be accomplished
3) the major hardware, software, connections, interfaces, and logistics support
capabilities
4) all personnel associated with the system, including decision makers, operators,
maintenance personnel, etc.
5) and the employment concepts and doctrine, if unchanging in nature.
The working group then compared these aspects of the hypothetical
architecture with the list of objectives produced by .Module 1, and determined that each
and every objective had specific time limitations that affected its relative importance to
the decision maker. As a result, initial boundaries were estabUshed for the SDI system
between the preoperational and operational phases. The working group defined the
preoperational phase as including all stages/phases prior to the actual wartime
operation of the SDI system. The operational phase would begin with the first actual
military' engagement, continuing until the system was rendered inoperational for
whatever reason. These boundaries will be further refined in the process module.
2. Effects of Soviet Ideology and New Results
The effects of the Soviet conceptual difTerences are somewhat more subtle in
this case than in the previous module. During the definition of the hypothetical
baseline architecture constituents, it is important to consider the Soviet view of each
component of the SDI system. .As stated in Chapter 2, the Soviets view SDI not as a
defensive system, but as a high - technology, aggressive ofTensive weapon system with
Unks to an overall strategic offensive defensive capability, designed to ensure U.S.
superiont}' and prohibit a Soviet second strike capability. From the Soviet point of
view, there is really only one possible conflict scenario for the employment of SDI. and
that is one to support a U.S. imperialistic first strike againsi the good and just causes
of socialism.
From the Soviet point of view, the functions to be accompUshed. major
hardware and software components, personnel associated with the system, and the
employment concepts all share the common purpose of defeating and destroying the
Soviet Union. Therefore. Soviet etTorts to prevent the system from ever reaching the
deployment phase are of the utmost importance and have the greatest priority. These
efibrts, ranging from propaganda and manipulation to covert attacks on the system
components and possibly even to a preemptive strike before deployment of the system
has been completed, force another look at the boundaries established by the working
group. While the concept of preoperational and operational phases is basically valid,
emphasis needs to be made by the decision makers on the preoperational phase as it is
a ver\' real possibiUty that the SDI system will never reach the operational phase. The
decision makers, then, need to maximize the effects of the objectives in the
preoperational phase. Any U.S. political gains achieved during this period as a result
of SDI will be of even greater value should SDI become defunct, for whatever reason.
Therefore, having established two phases as boundaries, preoperational and
operational, and determining that, given the Soviet determination to prevent
deployment of the SDI system, emphasis should be placed on the preoperational phase,
these phases can now be further refined by the application of the process module.
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D. MODULE 3: PROCESS DEFINITION
1. Workshop Results
Module three, the process definition module, takes a given system
configuration, such as a specific scenario and mission, and defines the processes needed
to fulfill the mission. The working group, considering the two boundary' phases and
the list of decision maker objectives, first evaluated the importance of each objective in
terms of the hfecycle of the SDI system. Objectives like popular support, credibility to
U.S. population, early availability, visibility to the Soviets, and incentive for Soviets to
shift strategy, were determined to be of importance during the early part of the
development cycle, while other objectives, such as effective military target defense and
compatibility with NCA structure, were essential to later phases. Using these
determinations, the working group then developed several categories relating to the
original boundaries, as follows:
1) Preoperational
a) prcconceptual - that period beginning with President Reagan's
announcement and continuing until the public recognizes a tangible SDI
system.
b) concept definition - the period during which the abstract concept is
refined and researched, with regards to current and future technology,
and afeasible system results.
c) Developm.ent. test, deployment - the period of actual system
construction, testing, and deployment.
d) Initial operational capacity (IOC) through full operational capacity
(FOC) - the period lasting from initial deployment of the first system
components until the complete system is available for military
operations. This can be seen as a protracted research and development
phase.
2) Operational
a) operation/military engagement - the period of actual military
engagement and wartime operations.
b) pcstoperational - the period following the first nuclear exchange.
Using their revised boundaries, the working group members then reevaluated
'he criteria of the decision makers, developed in Module 1. individually then
collectively, determining which objectives were really of value, and at what point in the
development cycle that value occurred. Their combined results produced a general
concensus of the majority, shown in Table 2.
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TABLE 2





Popular support preconcept, concept definition,




Low technical risk development
Visibility preconcept, concept definition,
IOC - FOC
Incentive to shift preconcept. concept definition,
development, ICC - FOC
Support of allies ( none)
Create uncertainty operation
Treaty compatibility preconceptual
Affordability concept definition, development,
IOC - FOC
Eff. city def. ( none)
Eff. target def. IOC - FOC, operation
Eff. mult, engage. operation
No U. S. damage operation
Crisis Stability preconcept, concept definition,
development, postoperational
Transient stability ( none)
Compatibility w/NCA IOC - FOC, operation
It is clear that the objectives relating to political issues fall into the preoperational
category and its subcategories, emphasizing again the significance of SDI in the early
phases as a policy making tool. These results were then used to develop the national
goals of SDI, through the appUcation of Module 4, the integration of statics and
dvnamics module.
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2. Effects of Soviet Ideology and New Results
The main objective of the Soviet anti - SDI campaign, to defeat the system
prior to full deployment and operational capability in order to maintain the Soviet view
of deterrence, necessitates a second look at the assignment of time period value to
several categories. Popular support, early availability, credibility to U.S. population,
low technical risk, visibility to Sos'iets. economic strain, government confusion,
compatability with arms control treaties. aiTordability, and uncertainty for Soviet
planners need to be emphasized throughout the entire preoperational phase, not just
certain periods of the preoperational phase.
The key differences, however, result from consideration of the Soviet
ideological differences. The first concerns the support of allies objective. The working
group determined that this objective was not critical during any phase. The Soviets,
however, see allied support as a critical aspect and are spending considerable time and
money on a carefully designed propaganda campaign attempting to incite NATO fears
that SDI will decouple the nuclear security umbrella over Europe. Since a major point
of Soviet military strategy is to decouple the U.S. NATO alliance, forcing U.S.
withdrawal from Europe, their ability to prohibit NATO support for SDI will further
this strategy. Lack of NATO support will also affect the funding SDI receives from
outside U.S. government sources. NATO fears can possibly color their interpretations
of the arms control treaties, again dealing a blow to the U.S. SDI program. As a
result, the support of aUies objective needs to be considered critical throughout the
preoperational phase.
A second issues arises from the transient phase stability objective, which again
was determined by the working group not to be important in any phase. However,
since the Soviets want to prevent a viable SDI system from ever becoming operational,
attacks on the SDI system during the transient phases of deployment and initial
operational capacity are possible, should all other preventive means fail. The outcomes
of such a scenario are varied, but all point to a risk in terms of national security and
economic stature. Therefore, transient phase stabihty should be considered as critical
during the latter part of the preoperational phase. The remainder of the
objectives criteria and their value during the development cycle are not affected by the
Soviet background information.
Using Module ?, the decision makers' objectives have been weighed with
regards to the SDI svstem boundaries and subdivisions. Vlodule 4, the integration
module, can now be applied.
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E. MODULE 4: INTEGRATION OF STATICS AND DYNAMICS
I. Workshop Results
Module 4. the integration o[ statics and dynamics module, relates the
information flow and process functions to the organizational structure, as well as
relating the physical entities to the process functions. At the SDI workshop, Module 4
was used to tie the results of the three previous modules to the national goals of SDI.
The working group, using the previously developed decision maker's objectives and
their relative importance and location within the system boundaries, and considering
the influence of the hypothetical baseline architecture, determined the national goals to
be:
1) Eliminate the use offeree in conflict resolution
2) Preserve and enhance domestic societal cohesion
3) Preserve and enhance the cohesion of U.S. alliances;
4) .Maintaui leadership in science and technology;
5) Provide for stable growth of U.S. economy.
Furthermore, the working group decomposed each national goal into subgoals, as
follows:
1) Eliminate use of force in conflict resolution
a) deter nuclear conflicts
b) deter conventional conflicts with escalation potential
c) negotiate institutional restraints
d) provide effective city defense
e) provide effective defense of military assets
f) modify Soviet goals and strategy
g) provide incentives for deescalation
h) slow down arms race
i) assure crisis stability at all levels.
2) Preserve and enhance domestic societal cohesion
a) increase; strengthen educational base
b) ensure the integrity and etTectiveness of domestic communications
c) publicize the merits of U.S. political system
d) communicate efTectively the U.S. goals and objectives
e) provide effective city defense
provide elTective defense of militarv' assets
g) maintain elTective propaganda and counterpropaganda activities.
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3) Preserve and enhance the cohesion of U.S. alliances
a) promote joint U.S. - AlUed niilitan.- research and development
h) increase; strengthen educational base
c) publicize the merits of U.S. political system
d) communicate efiectively the U.S. goals and objectives
e) provide elTective defense of militan.' assets
modify Soviet goals and strategy
g) maintain effective propaganda and counterpropaganda activities.
4) Maintain leadership in science and technology
a) invest in technology base
b) increase; strengthen educational base
c) stimulate private investment in advanced technologies.
5) Provide for stable growih of U.S. economy
a) invest in technology base
b) stimulate private investment in advanced technologies
c) provide for effective federal budget control process.
As can be seen in the preceding lists, some of the subgoals are shared by
dilTerent national goals. For example, the subgoal maintain effective propaganda and
counterpropaganda activities appears in both the preserve and enhance domestic
societal cohesion and preserve and enhance the cohesion of U.S. alliances national
goals. It is from these areas of overlap of the national goals, subgoals that led to the
working group development of possible MOPEs.
2. Effects of Soviet Ideology and New Results
The diiTerences between U.S. and Soviet perceptions are perhaps most clearly
exhibited m the area of national goals. From the list provided above, it is obvious that
the U.S. sees, and wants to project, SDI as a defensive weapons system leading to a
situation in which world peace exists. The Soviets also want world peace, but to them
world peace means the capitaUsts have been defeated and socialism has been installed
as the system of v/orld government. While the U.S. accepts deterrence as a stable
situation, the Soviets see deterrence as inevitably breaking down, eventually leading to
nuclear escalation.
Of the national goals and subgoals, only two subgoals require modification to
reflect Soviet ideological difTerences. SDI will not, from the Soviet point of view,
modify Soviet goals and strategy, nor provide incentives for Soviet
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deescalation/stability. What SDI will do, though, is provide a tool that modifies Soviet
behavior, as stated previously in Module 1. SDI will also provide a negotiation chip,
that, used correctly, can lead to deescalation in specific areas, resulting from
concessions made by the U.S. as well as the Soviet Union.
While the efTects of the Soviet background made minimal changes in the
workshop results, it is essential that the Soviet view of our national goals for SDI be
kept in mind during the de\-eiopment process, because it is that viewpoint that drives
the Soviet response, and that response greatly affects the success or failure of SDI.
The next module, specification of measures, will demonstrate the counter effects of
Soviet ideology on SDI effectiveness.
F. MODULE 5: SPECIFICATION OF MEASURES
1. Workshop Results
Module 5. the specification of measures module, tracks the four prior modules
in order to specify measures necessary to address the problem at hand. At the
workshop. Module 5 was used to produce possible measures for determining whether
or not SDI is successful, based on the national goals, broad policy issues, and the
objectives of the decision makers, developed in earlier sections. The objectives,
com.bined wilh the redundancy among the subgoals, were mapped into the national
goals to produce the following five interdependent derivative measures of policy
effectiveness:
1) Affordable Risk - measure of acceptable risk in areas of arms control.
technology, damage to U.S.
2) Leverage - measure of how well SDI drives Soviet policy in directions the U.S.
wants.
3) Operational Effectiveness - measure of how well SDI really defends U.S.
4) Perception - measure of how SDI is accepted in the U.S.. by allied nations and
the Soviet Union.
5) Stability - measure of economic, political, and militan,^ stabihty.
The working group determined that the derived measures relate to the national goals
as:
1) Eliminate the use of force in conflict resolution measurable by perception,
stability, and leverage
2) Preserve and enhance domestic societal cohesion measurable by affordable
risk, leverage, operational effectiveness, perception, and stability
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3) Preserve and enhnace the cohesion of U.S. alliances, measurable by stability,
affordable risk, perception
4) Demonstrate leadership in science and technology, measurable by stability,
afibrdable risk, perception, operational effectiveness
5) Provide for stable growth of U.S. economy, measurable by perception,
stability, affordable risk.
A good example of how the objectives were tied to the MOPEs by the
working group can be seen with the popular support objective. Popular support is
critical in the preoperational phase, particularly in the preconceptual. concept
definition, and system deployment stages. The working group found it to be essential
to all five of the national goals. Popular support translates to one component of the
perception MOPE. Means of measuring popular support, discussed at the workshop
include:
1) election results, particularly those of congressional, senatorial or presidential
races, where SDI was a strong issue
2) amount of congressional funding available to SDIO and associated research
3) amount of positive'negative SDI press co\'erage from all media sources.
Most of the other objectives could be traced through the modules, associated
v^ith one of the five derivative MOPEs. to produce a more specific surrogate measure
of effectiveness. It was at this point that the time and resource constraints of the
Vv'orkshop surfaced, and the application of the MCES was halted.
2. Effects of Soviet Ideology and New Results
The primar>' effect of Soviet ideology on the development of measures is not
semantic, as m the previous cases. At this point, the Soviet responses to the SDI
program begin to take effect and therefore must be included as a factor in any
measurement process. Continuing the example begun in the last section, the means of
measuring popular support/perception must take into consideration the effects of the
Soviet disinformation propaganda campaign. This campaign affects not only the
average American or European watching television or reading the newspaper, but
through them the results of elections, congressional votes, and available funding. As
for other examples, the Soviet willingness to allow SDI to be used as a bargaining chip
in arms control negotiations detenrunes the effectiveness of the leverage MOPE. The
economic strains endured by the Soviet government as it searches for alternate means
of defeating SDI and maintaining their idea of deterrence are reflected in the stabiUty
MOPE.
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These factors must be taken into consideration during the development of
more specific MOPEs. Based on the Soviet background information, as well as the
results of the .VICES application thus far. more specific surrogate measures could be
developed and possibly quantified in the areas of arms control, economic shifts, and
propaganda campaigns. These will be expanded upon in the next chapter. The
possible applicarions of Modules 6 and 7 will now be discussed, even though resource
constraints prevent their actual applications.
G. MODULE 6: DATA GENERATION
Module 6 encompasses data generation by exercise, simulation, experiment,
and, or subjective judgements. In terms of the overall political effects of SDI, and the
derived measures developed at the workshop, several means exist for the generation of
data. AlTordable risk data generation could come from computer simulation programs,
van,"ing from the acceptable number of losses from weapons strikes to the number of
dollars that can be invested in SDI research without knowing whether or not a viable
weapons defense system will be produced. Operational effectiveness data, at this point,
will be restricted to data from computer simulations, such as the Alphatech BM C3
Architecture Evaluation Model, which is under contract to the Naval Air Development
Center (NADC) through funding from SDIO. This model is designed to evaluate the
BM C3 eflectiveness of the five "horserace" architectures being considered by SDIO.
Data can also be generated at the National Test Bed Facility, however, treaty
restrictions on types of testing permitted will limit this option. Data generation on
perception can take many forms, ranging from polls, surveys, and their subsequent
statistical analysis, to the rather tedious collection and evaluation of election results,
letters to the editor, or the volume of media resources allocated to SDI. As mentioned
in the last section, data of this type can be used to measure the surrogate perception
measure of the success of the L'.S. /Soviet propaganda campaign. Leverage data
generation would be somewhat more elusive, as it is difficult to determine whether or
not a countpv" is adhering to arms control treaties. Again, data generation could come
from a count of warheads/missiles, both those negotiated away and those developed to
counter SDI. This data can be used to measure the surrogate leverage measure
mentioned in the previous section, of the success of arms control negotiations. Data
generation for the stability MOPE could be a collection of stock market data,
combined with data on the other leading economic indicators for both the L'.S. and
Soviet Union, or a comparison of expenditures in the areas of defense, social services.
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etc. This data can then be used to measure the surrogate stability measure of the
current economic status of each country. Each of these last three surrogate measures,
and a means of quantifying each, will be discussed in Chapter 5.
For a system as complex as SDI, which evokes such extreme responses from all
sectors of the world, data generation is an extremely complicated issue. Years could be
spent accumulating data to support the MOPEs alone, not to mention the other
aspects of SDI approached at the Workshop. To date, considerable effort has been
put into identiPv-ing possible means for measuring the etTectiveness of the SDI system.
At this time, as the 1990 decision date rapidly approaches, efforts should proceed into
the areas of quantification of those measures, with data generation to support the
quantification.
H. MODULE 7: AGGREGATION OF MEASURES
Module 7 is the aggregation of measures/data and interpretation model. While
the task cf generating data appears overwhelming, it can barely compare to the
intricacies involved in aggregating and interpreting the data and measures. There are
so many subtleties to be accounted for during the aggregation. For example, this
author belie\'es the following questions will seriously affect the final result of the
leN'erage MOPE, and its surrogate measure of success in arms control negotiations:
1) Were the warheads/missiles negotiated away current technology or older
generation weapons about to be disarmed anway?
2) Were they aimed at the U.S. or Europe?
3) Have they been replaced with improved conventional missiles?
4) Can the status of these weapons really be verified?
Each of these questions should, somehow, be translated into a weighting factor and
applied to the overall analysis of the leverage MOPE.
For each MOPE, a similar set of questions pertaining to the aggregation of data
can be generated. A means cf weighing the data must be established, enabling the
measures to be quantified. Then, a means of equating the results of the measures must
be determined in order to allow these results to be of assistance to the decision makers
when they answer the question "is SDI effective?" With the 1990 decision date rapidly
approaching, aggregation of measures, like data generation, can offer significant
advantaaes to the decision maker.
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I. SUMMARY
This chapter has applied the MCES to the overall policy issues ofSDI. The SDI
MCES MOE workshop results were presented, compared with the Soviet ideological
difl'erences, and the workshop results modified when necessary. The overall outcome of
the application of the first five modules was the derivation of five general MOPE's.
After considering the Soviet background information presented in Chapter 2, surrogate
measures o[ elfectiveness v/ere generated for three of the MOPEs. While the
application efforts stopped with Module 5, possibilities were discussed for Modules 6
and 7. The next chapter will address the possible quantification of the revised
measures determined in this chapter.
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V. DEVELOPMExNT OF MEASURES
A. INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter, the results of the Working Group's application of the MCES
to the overall policy issues of SDI were presented. The five derivative measures,






After considering the Soviet ideological differences, as well as the current Soviet
political and technological status, as described in Chapter 2, three more specific
surrogate measures evolved at the end of Chapter 4, as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
SURROGATE MEASURES AND THEIR MOPE
MOPE Surrogate Measure
Perception success of propaganda/counter propaganda
campaign
Leverage success of arms control negotiations
Stability current economic status of each country
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the possible quantification of the
surrogate measures. This chapter will not produce any values or numbers for these
measures. However, it will present suggestions that, with further research, could be
developed into actual quantitative measures of SDI political effectiveness. The
aggregation of values are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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B. PERCEPTION - THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN
Chapter 2 discussed the ongoing Soviet propaganda campaign, aimed at
fomenting dissent in both the U.S. and Europe. The campaign has two basic
components. The Soviets first want to instiil fear in the public that any or all of the
following are true:
1) SDI violates the 19^2 ABM Treaty
2) SDI is not technically feasible
3) SDI will not lead to a saler world, but will instead cause an unprecedented
arms race
4) If SDI is successful, it will decouple the NATO alliance.
At the same time the Soviets are publicizing the evils of SDI, the second part of
their propaganda campaign is to present Soviet General Secretary' Gorbachev as a
peace loving individual willing to work towards arms control, only to have his
initiatives refused by President Reagan.
The United States is also conducting a propaganda 'counter propaganda
campaign, in which SDI is depicted as the greatest peace initiative ever proposed.
President Reagan has even offered to share SDI technology, after it is developed, with
the world, in the hopes of eUminating the need for nuclear weapons. In fact, SDI is
being compared to the Kennedy administration goal of putting a man on the moon - a
technological challenge that the U.S. should be proud to meet.
In terms of measuring the efTectiveness of the U.S. campaign, and subsequently
the perception \iOPE, the major media sources - newspaper magazine, television, and
radio - need to be considered. A major element in any good propaganda compaign is
deception. An underlying assumption in the measurement of the surrogate measure is
that each countr>'''s campaign would successfuU mask the origin of the information so
that the average citizen would not recognize that the information is propaganda.
Furthermore, the U.S. and Soviet propaganda efforts will not be individually
identifiable. Therefore, one way to measure the success of the U.S. campaign over the
Soviet campaign, is to consider pro - SDI information as originating from the U.S. and
anti - SDI information as originating from the Soviet Union. Another option would be
to consider the positive and negative elTects of the information on the average citizen's
opinion of SDI. For the written media, the number of column inches of positive and
negative propaganda can be measured. For television and radio broadcasts, the
number of minutes allocated can be measured. Weighting factors would need to be
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applied, such as assigning greater value to major news broadcasts, cover stories,
headline stories, as opposed to the value give the less visible articles broadcasts.
Another weighting factor to be considered is the cost of the campaign to each country
and whether or not the countp.' can afford that cost. [Ref 13] Once all factors have
been considered, a number can be assigned to each side, say
\s ='"d x,„
Using these factors, a possible measurement of the effectiveness of the U.S.
program could be found from applying a straight ratio test, such that
if X , X > 1
us su
then the U.S. propaganda, counterpropaganda campaign is more effective than the
SoN'iet, and therefore from the perception point of view. SDI is successful.
To give a numerical example of this concept, suppose after tabulating the value
for the positive negative SDI press coverage, the pro - Gorbachev coverage, and
applying the appropriate weighting factors, the values for X and X were 150 and
160, respectively. It must be emphasized that these are not representative values, but
merely assumed values to more clearly demonstrate the concept under discussion.
These values are not scientifically determined, and have no bearing on the actual
topic. With this in mind, continuing the example then indicates:
The results of this fabricated example would indicate the Soviet campaign has been
more successful. However, accurate results would require significant research and more
complicated calculations, to properly account for all weighting factors. A more
scientific analysis would still result in a degree of uncertainty.
C. STABILITY - ECONOMIC SHIFTS
One of the national goals of SDI is to provide a growing and stable U.S.
economy. As explained in Chapter 2, the opposite side of this goal is to further
pressure the already strained Soviet economy to the point where the Soviets would be
forced to make significant cuts in their defense budget. In the U.S., trends such as the
stock market, leading economic indicators, and consumer price indices can be
evaluated, and the state of the economy determined. However, m their closed society,
the Soviets do not openly publicize such economic statistics, and what is publicized is
often fabricated. One source of such information is the CIA Economic Analysis. A
more reUable, commonly availabile. indicator is the Gross National Product (GNP) of
^?
each countn/'. A comparison can be made to determine whether or not the relative
groulh of the GNP can support and maintain the relative growth of the defense budget
resultmg from SDI. If the U.S. grov/th can support SDI technological demands, but
the Soviet growth cannot, then SDI has been elTective as. an economic, stability
threatening tool.
More specifically, in terms of measuring the surrogate measure of the economic
shifts of the two countries, the average percent increase of each GNP over the past five
years should be determined. Then, the percent of GNP spent on SDI technology by
the U.S. and counter SDI technology by the Soviets could be calculated and averaged
over the five years since President Reagan announced the SDI research program. Since
it might be difncuit to determine exactly what Soviet programs have SDI applications,
another more general average of the percentage of GNP spent on defense could be
calculated for the five years before and after SDI. enabling an estimate of percent
spending on SDI counter SDI technology to be made.
The values obtained for each coumr\' would be:
1) Average percent growth of GNP for last five years
2) Average percent of GNP spent on defense before SDI
3) Average percent of GNP spent on defense after SDI
4) Average percent of GNP spent on SDIcounter SDI programs.
For the sake of an example, let's assume the following values, shown in Table 4.
Again, as in the previous section, these values are by no means accurate or













In this fabricated example it appears that U.S. economic grovvih can support the cost
of SDI technology, but the Soviet economy is not growing at a rate that would support
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the long term maintanence of the cost. This example, then, indicates the U.S.
economy is in a more stable position.
D. LEVERAGE - ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Possibly the greatest indicators of the efieciiveness of SDI as a policy making
tool, as well as of the intensity of Soviet paranoia about SDI. came out of the last
arms control talks, held in Iceland. It is extremely significant that every arms control
proposal put forth by the Soviets was contingent upon restrictions and limitations on
the L'.S. SDI program, even in the research phase. This shows that, carefully used,
SDI can present itself as an effective negotiating chip. At this early stage, concessions
might not afTect the system's long run operational capabilities. Schedule delays, as
offered by President Reagan, can work to U.S. advantage. If the program is already
behind schedule, why not olTer to delay deployment in return for Soviet olTensive
limitations?
The Soviets are. however, extremely clever negotiators, and if a proposal seems
too good to be true, it probably is. In reality, the effectiveness of SDI as a bargaining
tool must be carefulh' evaluated. The number of warheads/missiles to be reduced in
the Soviet arsenal is not as significant as the type. age. location and capability of those
weapons. Therefore, the effort to quantify the leverage measure from the Soviet side
should not deal with specific numbers of weapons disarmed, but with more
effectiveness oriented measures like the decUne of force effectiveness. An example of
this could be a measure of the total megatonnage of the Soviet versus U.S. ICBM
forces after negotiations and concessions relating to SDI have been made. Likewise,
measurement of U.S. SDI limitations should not deal with the number of platforms/
weapons conceded, but rather with the decrease of the efficiency of the SDI system
itself.
It is obvious that of the three derivative measures presented this is the most
difficult to quantify, because of the dilTiculties in verificaton of arms control,
complicated by the closed nature of the Soviet society. However, based on the
numbers and specifications generated by future arms control discussions, it could be
possible, albeit difllcult, to quantify the leverage MOPE in the near future.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented several possibilities for the quantification of three
surrogate measures developed from the derived MOPEs o[ perception, stabihty, and
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leverage, which resulted from the application of the MCES in the previous chapter.
While some surrogate measures were more easily quantified than others, and only the
perception MOPE is clearly quantifiable at this time, the leverage and stability MOPEs
have the potential to be quantified in the near future. Continued reasearch in this area
should provide a useful product to the decision makers prior to their 1990 developm.ent
decision.
^:)
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This ihesis has shown that the Soviet responses, to date, to the SDI research and
development program are significant enough to indicate some level of political
effectiveness of SDI. The MCES was chosen as the methodology to evaluate this level
of eiTectiveness, and has proven to be a robust tool leading to the development of
measures of eiTectiveness. At the 1986 SDI MCES/MOE workshop, the
overall political SDI working group applied the MCES to the policy issues of SDI,
with respect to the national goals, and derived a set of VIOPEs. This thesis has
incorporated Soviet ideological and conceptual differences into the working group
application, modifying the workshop results accordingly. Finally, this thesis has shown
that not only can MOPEs be derived for SDI at this point, but that they can also
potentially be quantified.
Of the five MOPEs derived at the workshop, Perception, Stability, and Leverage
demonstrated the greatest potential for quantification at this time. A surrogate
measure of effectiveness for each MOPE was defined in order to produce a measurable
quantity. The success of the propaganda campaigns measure was developed to assist
m the quantification of the perception MOPE. The success of arms control
negotiations measure was used to begin quantifying the leverage MOPE. The
comparision of the current economic status of the U.S. /Soviet Union was used to assist
in the quantification of the stability MOPE. The determination of actual values for the
measures exceeded the scope of this thesis. However, specialists in this field, with a
considerable amount of effort, could produce actual values.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Future work with the MCES on this issue should to concentrate on the
application of Modules 6 and "J, data generation and aggregation of measures,
respectively. SDIO faces the difficult task, in 1990, of convincing Congress that
funding development of the SDI research program should continue and expand.
Attempting to secure funding from Congress for any purpose is hard; securing funding
for a controversial program like SDI will be even more difficult. Therefore, if the
MCES can be exploited to its fullest potential, and Modules 6 and 7 used to produce
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actual values relating to the efTectiveness of SDI. the SDIO stafT can present some




This appendix contains the most current MCES figures available at the time of
this research. However, the MCES is an evolving methodology. As such, the figures









Figure A.l The MCES Methodology,
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Figure A. 10 Module 7: Aggregation of Measures.
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